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PRECAP; Elaine Mitchell v. Glacier County: Standing in the Face of 
Government Accountability 
Abbey Eckstein 
 Oral argument is set for Wednesday, August 9, 2017, at 9:30 
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. 
Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
I.  QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 Under Montana Law, does Mitchell have standing against 
Glacier County and the State of Montana when she alleged a foreseeable 
injury? Is a foreseeable injury enough to constitute a concrete injury 
required in order to have standing? 
 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Appellant Elaine Mitchell, a taxpayer in Glacier County, brought 
suit against Glacier County for its mismanagement of finances.1 Mitchell 
moved for partial summary judgment and class certification, and the 
District Court dismissed all of Mitchell’s claims for lack of standing.2  
 On appeal, Mitchell argues that she has standing because she has 
a foreseeable injury in the form of an increase in her property tax.3 She 
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of Montana law as 
well as private attorney general status.4 Mitchell also argues that she has 
standing due to Article VIII Section 12 of the Montana Constitution, 
which requires that governmental entities have strict accountability of 
monies and revenue.5  
 Glacier County contends that Mitchell does not have a concrete 
injury, as she only claimed that it was “foreseeable.”6 Additionally, 
Glacier County argues that her claims are now moot because she did not 
file for a stay or supersedeas bond.7  The State of Montana argues that 
Mitchell does not have standing under the Single Audit Act (SAA) 
because the Legislature did not intend for it to confer individual rights 
upon plaintiffs, and the SAA is discretionary, not mandatory, for the 
Department of Administration to enforce.8 The State also argues that 
                                                          
1 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2, Mitchell v. Glacier County, https://perma.cc/F9E6-BLV7 (Mont. 
Feb. 9, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 11. 
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Id. at 12. 
6 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief at 10, Mitchell v. Glacier County, 
https://perma.cc/BZ73-NPCP (Mont. Apr. 10, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716). 
7 Id. at 12. 
8 Appellee State of Montana’s Answering Brief at 9–10, Mitchell v. Glacier County, 
https://perma.cc/23T3-GDKB (Mont. Apr. 10, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716). 
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Article VIII Section 12 of the Montana Constitution is not a self-
executing clause, thus Mitchell lacks standing.9 
 
III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Plaintiff Elaine Mitchell, an accountant and tax preparer who 
practices in Glacier County, paid her property taxes under protest due to 
the County violating budgeting and accounting standards.10 This 
violation was discovered through a fiscal year (FY) audit of the years 
2013 and 2014.11 The audit, published in March 2015, covered the two 
past years and noted several weaknesses, imbalances, and deficiencies in 
Glacier County’s budget.12 The deficit fund balance due totaled $752,901 
for 2013 and $1,526,925 for 2014. The report also listed the specific 
violations of Montana statutes.13 The report showed that 29 separate 
County funds contained over $5 million in deficits.14 Other taxpayers in 
Glacier County, in addition to Mitchel, paid the entirety of their taxes 
under protest.15 Mitchell brought her claims as a Glacier County property 
taxpayer and on behalf of the putative class of property taxpayers in 
Glacier County who paid their taxes under protest.16 The total combined 
taxpayers’ protested taxes was over $1 million dollars, which Glacier 
County placed in a separate protest fund. 17 
 Mitchell and the other plaintiffs brought six claims against 
Glacier County and the State: (1) a declaration stating that they can pay 
taxes under protest until the County complies with its statutory duties; 
(2) a declaration that the County is violating the “strict accountability” 
provision of the Montana Constitution; (3) an order requiring the State to 
withhold public funds under the SAA until the County complies; (4) an 
order that the State hold accountable County officials who have not 
performed their duties properly; (5) an order for a receiver to be 
appointed, who would ensure compliance by the County; and (6) a 
declaration that the County violated the Right to Know provisions of the 
State Constitution.18 In response, Glacier County and the State alleged 
that the Plaintiff and putative class had no standing to bring their 
action.19 The District Court ruled that the Plaintiffs lacked standing 
because they had not suffered a concrete injury to property and did not 
                                                          
9 Id. at 32–33. 
10 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3. 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 Id. at 4-6. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. at 1; Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 7. 
16 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
17 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 7–9. 
18 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
19 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 10; Appellee State of Montana’s 
Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 10–11. 
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have concrete rights under the Montana Constitution and statutes to 
confer standing.20 The Plaintiffs appealed. 21  
 
IV.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.  Appellants Mitchell and Putative Class 
 
1. Glacier County and the State violated their fiduciary duty to the 
Plaintiffs by not following the “strict accountability” clause in the 
Montana Constitution. 
 
 Mitchell argues that the “strict accountability” clause in Article 
VIII of the Montana Constitution puts the government in the position of a 
trustee to taxpayers.22 As a trustee, the government owes a fiduciary duty 
to properly manage public monies.23 Article VIII Section 12 of the 
Montana Constitution states, “The legislature shall by law insure strict 
accountability of all revenue received and money spent by the state and 
counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities.”24 
Mitchell argues that the Legislature enacted statutes, such as the 
Montana Local Government Accounting and Budgeting Laws and the 
Local Government Budget Act, to implement the “strict accountability” 
clause in the Montana Constitution.25  
 Additionally, Mitchell argues that Glacier County and the State 
violated the SAA, which states that local units of government have to 
annually file audit reports with the Department of Administration.26 
Mitchell specifically points to the purpose of the SAA, listed in § 2–7–
502(2)(e), which states that the SAA is supposed to “ensure that the 
stewardship of local government entities is conducted in a manner to 
preserve and protect the public trust.”27 Mitchell argues that Glacier 
County and the State, in particular, violated their duty to preserve and 
protect the public trust by mismanaging the county funds.28  
 
2. Mitchell has met the three elements required to have a 
justiciable controversy. 
 
                                                          
20 Id. at 5. 
21 Id. at 3.  
22 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 12. 
23 Id. 
24 Mont. CONST. art. VIII, § 12. 
25 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 13; see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7–6–609 to 7–6–611 
(2017) for the statutes in the Montana Local Government Accounting and Budgeting Laws, and 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7–6–4001 to 7–6–4603 (2017) for the Local Government Budget Act. 
26 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 13; see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2–7–501 to 2–7–522 
(2017).  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 12. 
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 Mitchell argues that the District Court erred when it held she did 
not have a “sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes.”29 There is 
a three-part analysis to determine whether there is a justiciable 
controversy: (1) the parties must have existing and genuine rights or 
interests, not theoretical; (2) the controversy must not merely be a debate 
or argument about a purely political, administrative, philosophical, or 
academic conclusion, but a controversy on which the court may 
effectively operate judgment; and (3) the judicial determination of the 
controversy will have the effect of a final judgment in law or in equity 
upon the rights, status or legal relationships of the parties.30 Mitchell 
argues that those three elements are met for the following reasons. 
 First, Mitchell argues that her interest is “existing and genuine” 
and is not theoretical, as she lives and pays taxes in Glacier County.31 
Glacier County violated laws “designed to insure strict accountability of 
public revenue,” thus directly impacting Mitchell as a taxpayer.32 
Additionally, the State did not enforce the laws that the County violated 
and is also at fault.33 Second, Mitchell argues that this controversy is not 
an academic or political debate, and that the Court could operate 
judgment by granting declaratory and injunctive relief.34 Third, the 
judicial determination of this controversy would have the effect of a final 
judgment of law.35 
 Mitchell argues that the clause in Article VIII Section 12 of the 
Montana Constitution, which states “the legislature shall by law insure 
strict accountability of all revenue,” is a “directive to the Legislature,” 
and “is non-self-executing.”36 Because the Legislature enacted laws to 
implement “strict accountability” through the SAA and other laws listed 
above, this issue is justiciable; however, if the Legislature did not act, the 
failure to act would be a non-justiciable political question.37 Mitchell 
cites Columbia School District v. State,38 where the Court ruled that, 
once the legislature acted or “executed” a provision, courts could 
determine whether “that enactment fulfills the Legislature’s 
constitutional responsibility.” Therefore, the courts would assure that the 
“system enacted by the Legislature enforces, protects, and fulfills the 
right” that has been granted by the Constitution.39 Mitchell argues that, 
once the Legislature implements the Constitution’s provisions, the Court 
                                                          
29 Id. at 14.  
30 Id. at 14–15 (see Chipman v. Northwest Healthcare Corp., 288 P.3d 193, 200 (Mont. 2012)). 





36 Id.  
37 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
38 109 P.3d 257, 260–61 (Mont. 2005). 
39 Id. at 16 (quoting Columbia School District, 109 P.3d at 261). 
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can find justiciable issues.40 Once the Legislature implements mandates 
in statutes, Courts have an obligation to guard the rights of that 
mandate.41  
 
3. Mitchell has standing, as a taxpayer, to challenge government 
entities for fiscal mismanagement, and it is foreseeable that she will 
suffer additional property tax burdens, thus showing that a foreseeable 
injury has the same effect as a threatened injury. 
 
 Standing concerns whether “the litigant is entitled to have the 
court decide the merits of the dispute.”42 There are two strands to 
standing. First is the case or controversy requirement, where the plaintiff 
must “clearly allege a past, present, or threatened injury to a property or 
civil right.”43 Additionally, the injury “must be one that would be 
alleviated by successfully maintaining the action.”44 The second strand to 
standing is prudential limitations.45  
 
 a. Mitchell has standing as a taxpayer according to 
Grossman, which relaxed the  standing requirements for taxpayers by 
allowing them to question the constitutional validity of  tax use. 
 
 Mitchell argues that the Court has recognized the standing of 
taxpayers in prior cases, such as Grossman v. State Dept. of Natural 
Resources.46 In Grossman, the Court stated, “We will recognize the 
standing of a taxpayer, without more, to question the state constitutional 
validity of a tax or use of tax monies” in regard to issues that directly 
affect the “constitutional validity of the state or its political subdivision 
action to collect the tax, issue bonds, or use the proceeds thereof.”47 The 
Appellants contend that the District Court incorrectly applied strict 
standing requirements, whereas Grossman correctly relaxed the standing 
requirements for taxpayers, stating, “[t]he rule that a taxpayer must be 
directly adversely affected to bring an action contesting the validity of 
state bonds or the use of tax monies is not as unbendable as our 
pronouncements in [other sorts of standing cases].”48 The Court in 
Grossman added an exception to taxpayer standing by allowing 
taxpayers to question the constitutional validity of taxes that directly 
affect the state or its political subdivision with collecting the tax.49  
                                                          
40 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16.  
41 Id. at 17. 
42 Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80, 91 (Mont. 2011). 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17; Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 91. 
46 Grossman v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 682 P.2d 1319 (Mont. 1984). 
47 Id. 682 P.2d at 1325.  
48 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20 (see Grossman, 682 P.2d at 1325). 
49 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20. 
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 b. It is foreseeable that Mitchell will suffer an injury, which 
is analytically akin to a  “threatened” injury. 
 
 In order to have standing, the complaining party must allege a 
past, present, or threatened injury to property or civil rights, and the 
injury must “be one that would be alleviated by successfully maintaining 
the action.”50 If a plaintiff alleges either a direct economic injury or is 
faced with criminal prosecution, the injury requirement of standing is 
more easily satisfied.51 To show an injury for standing purposes, the 
injury must be a “concrete harm that is actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”52 In Helena Parents Commission v. Lewis 
and Clark County Commissioners,53 the Court held that the plaintiffs had 
standing because they would incur additional tax burdens, and therefore 
had an economic injury. Mitchell contends that, similar to Helena 
Parents, she will suffer additional property tax burdens because of the 
County’s mismanagement of funds.54 
 Mitchell also notes that a threatened injury is sufficient for 
standing. She claims that a threatened injury is “no different than the 
‘foreseeable’ injury.”55 Mitchell urges that, similar to Helena Parents, 
the imposed tax burden was prospective and constituted a concrete 
injury.56 The mismanagement of funds makes it foreseeable that Mitchell 
and the other Plaintiffs would suffer an economic injury at some point in 
the future, and that is sufficient to meet the standing requirement.57   
 
4. The two countervailing factors against prudential limitations to 
standing apply to the Appellants’ circumstances. 
 
 Mitchell argues that the prudential limitations defined in 
Hefferman do not apply to her claims. The two prudential limitations 
from Hefferman that Mitchell is focusing on are: “a litigant may only 
assert her own constitutional rights or immunities,” and “the alleged 
injury must be distinguishable from the injury to the public, though not 
necessarily exclusive to the plaintiff.”58 Mitchell cites Lee v. State,59 
where the Court, when faced with a standing issue about challenging a 
speed limit, stated, “The acts of the legislature which directly concern 
                                                          
50 Id. (see Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831, 836, (Mont. 2014)).  
51 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 21. 
52 Heffernan, 255 P.3d 80 at 91. 
53 992 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Mont. 1996). 
54 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 22. 
55 Id. at 23. 
56 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 10, Mitchell v. Glacier County, https://perma.cc/RV6B-X44N (Mont. 
May 22, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716). 
57 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 23. 
58 Id. at 24 (citing Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 92). 
59 635 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Mont. 1981). 
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large segments of the public, or all the public, are not thereby insulated 
from judicial attack.” Otherwise, if a plaintiff wished to test the 
constitutional validity of a statute, the “Uniform Declaratory Judgment 
Act would become largely useless.”60 Mitchell argues that the District 
Court’s holding would render the Declaratory Judgement Act largely 
useless, and both Glacier County and the State would be insulated from 
judicial scrutiny.61 
 There are two countervailing factors that weigh against 
prudential limitations to standing. First is the “importance of the question 
to the public,” and second is “whether the statute at issue would 
effectively be immunized from review if the plaintiff were denied 
standing.”62 Mitchell argues that those factors apply here. The 
relationship between citizens and their government is of great 
importance, which satisfies the first factor.63 The second factor is also 
satisfied, as it is vital that citizens have recourse when government fails 
to enforce the law—especially when government officials fail to comply 
with a constitutional mandate.64 
  
5. The Private Attorney General Doctrine applies. 
 
 Mitchell argues that the Private Attorney General Doctrine 
applies, as the State’s Department of Administration and its Attorney 
General have not enforced the laws in question, including the “strict 
accountability” issue.65 The Court stated that the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine is “normally utilized when the government, for some 
reason, fails to properly enforce interests which are significant to its 
citizens.”66 Mitchell argues that, because the State has failed to enforce 
the laws at issue, this Doctrine applies.67 
 
6. The District Court erred when it held that the “Private Right of 
Action” Paradigm applied to Appellants. 
 
 The District Court held that the SAA and budgeting laws did not 
allow the Plaintiffs a “private right to petition for judicial relief.”68 
Mitchell contends that the District Court incorrectly confused federal 
rules with state rules of decision.69 Mitchell argues that, because federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts cannot develop 
                                                          
60 Id.  
61 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 25. 
62 Id. at 25–26. 
63 Id. at 26. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 27. 
66 In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 782 P.2d 898, 900 (Mont. 1989). 
67 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 27. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 28. 
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substantive common law rules of decision, unless Congress otherwise 
directs.70 Montana is a court of general jurisdiction, which Article VII 
Section 4 of the Montana Constitution states that the court has original 
jurisdiction over “all civil matter and cases at law and in equity.”71 The 
Montana Constitution also states, “Courts of justice shall be open to 
every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, 
property, or character.”72 Because Montana has general jurisdiction, 
Montana courts are able to “reform common law as justice requires.”73 
Mitchell argues that the “private right of action” paradigm is inapplicable 
here, as the Montana general jurisdiction applies and does not affect the 
status of her justiciability or standing issues.74 
 
7. This appeal is not moot, as the law does not require a stay or a 
supersedeas bond and the County improperly disbursed the protest tax 
fund. 
 
 Mitchell argues that her appeal is not moot because the tax 
protest claim did not require a stay pending appeal. Additionally, 
Mitchell argues that she can challenge the County’s conduct whether she 
pays under protest or not, so seeking declaratory judgment would not be 
moot in that matter. Because Mitchell claims that the County’s deficit 
spending will increase her tax burden in the future, her appeal is not 
moot.75 Furthermore, Mitchell contends that the County knew of the 
Plaintiff’s appeal—which was filed four days after the District Court’s 
order—and had no right to disburse the protest funds.76 Section 15–1–
402(4)(a) states that taxes that are placed in a protest fund must be 
retained in that fund “until the final determination of any action or 
suit.”77 Mitchell argues that “final determination” means a final appellate 
decision, as that would end uncertainty.78 Mitchell states that the County 
should “not be allowed to evade appellate review by unlawfully 
disbursing the funds and declaring its violations as ‘moot.’”79 
 
B. Appellee Glacier County 
 
 1. Mitchell does not have standing because she lacks a personal 
stake in the outcome of the case and has not presented an actual case. 
                                                          
70 Id. at 28–29. 
71 Mont. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
72 Mont. CONST. art. II, § 16. 
73 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Mountain West Bureau Ins. Co. v. 
Brewer, 69 P.3d 652, 657 (Mont. 2003)). 
74 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 30. 
75 Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 58, at 17. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 18. 
79 Id. 
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 Glacier County contends that Mitchell has not alleged any 
personal stake, such as a personal injury to a property or civil right, in 
her claims.80 According to Heffernan, a “personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy at the commencement of the litigation” is required in 
order to have standing.81 Glacier County argues that Mitchell’s allegation 
of a “foreseeable injury” is abstract, and is not sufficient to meet the 
standing requirement of having a “concrete” injury.82 Glacier County 
argues that Mitchell has not suffered a past, present, or threatened 
injury.83  
 Glacier County contends that Mitchell has not objected to the use 
of tax monies or to the validity of a tax, but instead has claimed that an 
injury to her is foreseeable.84 Glacier County agrees with the District 
Court, which found that Mitchell did not plead any loss of public funds, 
higher taxes, or reduced services.85 The District Court stated that 
“Mitchell’s disapproval” of Glacier County’s accounting and fiscal 
management skills is not enough for standing.86 Glacier County argues 
that, although there may have been mistakes in fiscal management which 
may be of concern to taxpayers, “generalized grievances” do not 
constitute a judicial controversy.87  
 Glacier County further argues that Mitchell does not have a 
concrete injury because of the manner in which she protested her taxes. 
According to the Montana Code Annotated, § 15–1–402(1)(a), the 
person protesting a property tax may contest “that portion of the property 
tax or fee protested.”88 Additionally, § 15–1–401(1)(b)(iii) states that the 
protested payment must “not exceed the difference between the payment 
for the immediately preceding tax year and the amount owing in the tax 
year protested unless a different amount results from the specified 
grounds of protest . . . .”89 Although Mitchell relied upon the “unless” 
portion of the statute, Mitchell did not specify what amount of tax was 
being protested, and for what reason other than that an injury to the 
taxpayers was foreseeable.90 
 Lastly, Glacier County argues that Mitchell is essentially 
requesting the Court grant injunctive relief for the County to better 
manage its finances.91 Glacier County contends that injunctive relief is 
                                                          
80 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 14. 
81 Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 90. 
82 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (see Schoof, 316 P.3d at 836). 
83 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 14. 
84 Id. at 16. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 17. 
87 Id. at 18. 
88 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–402(1)(a) (2017). 
89 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–402(1)(b)(iii) (2017). 
90 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 8. 
91 Id. at 22. 
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not available for protestation of taxes, and that Mitchell’s cause of action 
“has nothing to do with protestation of taxes.”92 Glacier County states 
that the Appellants are “demanding the Glacier County officials comply 
with their personal wishes as taxpayers,” and that “[s]uch actions are 
reserved for the voting booth.”93 
 
2. Mitchell cannot point to any individual concrete injury for her 
other claims. 
 
 Glacier County contends that, with regard to the Montana Local 
Government Accounting Laws, Local Government Budget Act, and 
SAA, Mitchell did not allege any concrete injury.94 For the SAA, Glacier 
County contends that there is no actual evidence in the record that the 
County violated the public trust, and therefore there is no concrete injury. 
In response to Mitchell’s claim concerning the Private Attorney General 
Doctrine, Glacier County states that the Doctrine does not apply against 
the County, as it is not a cause of action but is a claim for relief.95 As for 
justiciability, Glacier County argues that the Plaintiffs have no standing 
because their alleged claims are theoretical. Glacier County contends that 
Mitchell does not meet the three requirements for having a justiciable 
controversy. Mitchell’s claim of having a foreseeable injury is 
speculative and is not enough to have a justiciable controversy.96 
 
3. Mitchell’s Declaratory Judgment Action is not applicable to this 
case, and, for the most part, injunctive relief is not available for 
protestation of taxes.  
 
 Glacier County argues that Montana’s Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act is not applicable because of the taxation statutes in 
Montana.97 According to § 15–1–406 in the Montana Code Annotated, 
the remedy authorized for tax issues is “the exclusive method of 
obtaining a declaratory judgment concerning a tax authorized by the state 
. . . The remedy authorized by this section supersedes the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act established in Title 27, chapter 8.”98 Section 
15–1–406(1) states that a taxpayer may bring a declaratory judgment 
action in the District Court, but for (a) “illegal or improper” use by the 
department, or (b) if the tax was “illegally or unlawfully imposed or 
exceeded the taxing authority of the entity imposing the tax.”99 Glacier 
                                                          
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 23. 
94 Id. at 24–25. 
95 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 25. 
96 Id. at 26–27. 
97 Id. at 28. 
98 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–406 (2017).  
99 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–406(1) (2017). 
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County argues that the “only reason you can protest taxes to a County” is 
if the tax was illegally or unlawfully imposed, or if it exceeded the 
County’s taxing authority.100 Glacier County states that Mitchell did not 
allege illegal or unlawful tax usage, and that she merely wanted Glacier 
County to do “a better job of governance.”101 
 Glacier County believes that Mitchell is essentially asking for 
injunctive relief.102 However, under § 15–1–405(1), a court must not 
grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any tax except “where the 
tax or the part thereof sought to be enjoined is illegal or not authorized 
by law.”103 Glacier County argues that Mitchell did not raise a 
protestation of taxes claim, and that injunctive relief, as well as 
declaratory judgement, is not an available remedy. 
 
4. Because Mitchell did not file for a stay, the case is moot. 
 
 Glacier County argues that, even if Mitchell’s claims were ripe 
when they were made, her claims are now moot because she did not file 
for a stay or supersedeas bond. According to Reichert v. State, ex. rel., 
McCulloch,104 ripeness examines whether a non-existing injury will 
become an injury, or is too remote to support present adjudication; 
whereas mootness, on the other hand, asks if “an injury that has 
happened is too far beyond a useful remedy.” The personal interest 
requirement of standing, which occurs at the commencement of 
litigation, must continue throughout the case.105  
 Glacier County argues that Mitchell’s claims became moot 
because she did not file for a stay or supersedeas bond, according to 
Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 22.106 Glacier County 
contends that, even though it is not required, under Rule 22(1)(a)(i) 
Mitchell needed to file a motion to stay the District Court’s Order, or 
needed to suspend its Order pending appeal under Rule 22(1)(a)(iii). 
Because Mitchell did neither, Glacier County distributed the tax dollars 
held in the protest tax fund.107 Although it is not required to file for a 
stay, a party that does not seek a stay runs the risk of its appeal becoming 
moot.108 Glacier County contends that is the case for Mitchell. 
Additionally, § 15–1–402(4)(a) requires that protested taxes be put in the 
tax protest fund until there is a final determination of any suit. Glacier 
                                                          
100 Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 29 (emphasis in original). 
101 Id. at 30. 
102 Id. at 30. 
103 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–405(1) (2017).  
104 278 P.3d 455, 472 (Mont. 2012). 
105 Appellant Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 32 (see Greater Missoula Area Fedn. 
of Early Childhood Educators v. Childstart, Inc., 219 P.3d 888, 889 (Mont. 2009)). 
106 Appellant Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 32. 
107 Id. at 34. 
108 Id. at 36 (see Kennedy v. Dawson, 989 P.2d 390, 395 (Mont. 1999)).  
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County argues that the District Court’s decision was a final 
determination in this current suit.109 
 
C. Appellee State of Montana 
 
1. Mitchell lacks standing to sue the State under the SAA and 
Article VIII. 
 
 a. The Legislature, after enacting the SAA, did not intend 
to confer individual rights  sufficient enough to provide Mitchell 
standing.  
 
 The State contends that the SAA determines whether Mitchell 
has standing to sue the State for failing to enforce the law. Mitchell must 
allege a concrete injury to a legally protected interest established by the 
SAA, like a property or civil right.110 According to Schoof, standing 
depends on whether the constitutional or statutory provision “can be 
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to 
judicial relief.”111 The State contends that if a statute does not provide 
any individual rights “susceptible to injury or amenable to judicial 
relief,” then there is no standing to sue.112 
 The State also argues that Montana’s constitutional “case or 
controversy” requirement aligns with the case or controversy 
requirements set forth in Article III of the United States Constitution.113 
Article III of the United States Constitution states an actual or threatened 
injury may exist through statutes creating legal rights, which, when 
invaded, would create standing.114 The State argues that the District 
Court correctly held that there were no provisions within the SAA to 
establish individual civil rights.115 
 Furthermore, the State contends that the SAA is discretionary 
and does not grant individual rights to Mitchell. The State points to the 
language in certain sections of the Montana Code Annotated, such as § 
2–7–517(1), which states that the Department “may issue an order 
stopping payment of any state financial assistance.”116 The State also 
cites § 2–7–503(5), which “allows, but does not require,” the Department 
to audit or review local government entities.117 The State believes that the 
decision to withhold financial assistance is determined “in accordance 
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with rules adopted by the department,” according to § 2–7–515(3).118 
From there, the Department has the discretion to request the withholding 
of financial assistance. The State argues that the language of the rules is 
permissive; therefore, enforcement of the rules is not mandatory.119 
 
 b. The SAA does not provide a basis for Mitchell to bring a 
private action against the  State. 
 
 The State argues that the SAA does not provide any private right 
of action or citizen enforcement mechanism, and that only the 
Department has regulatory and enforcement provisions.120 The State 
distinguishes this situation from Wombold v. Associates Financial 
Services Company of Montana, Inc.,121 where the legislature granted 
certain rights to borrowers regarding the structure of their loans. In 
Wombold, the Court held that the legislative intent was to protect the 
borrowers, which allowed an implied private right of action.122 In 
comparison, the State argues that the SAA does not provide any 
“beneficial or remedial provisions aimed at a certain class of citizens,” 
and the SAA is enforced solely by the State.123 Additionally, the SAA 
does not provide attorney fees by a prevailing party, whereas in 
Wombold the Consumer Loan Act provided attorney fees.124 These 
differences illustrate that the SAA does not give Mitchell a private right 
of action. 
 
 c. Mitchell does not have standing under Article VIII 
Section 12 of the Montana  Constitution because it is not a self-
executing clause. 
 
 The State contends that Mitchell is not challenging the 
constitutionality of the SAA under Article VIII Section 12 of the 
Montana Constitution. Instead, Mitchell argues that the State breached its 
duties directly under the SAA and the duties owed under Article VIII.125 
The State agrees with the District Court that Article VIII Section 12 does 
not “grant an individual the right to be free of municipal fiscal 
mismanagement.”126 The State argues that Article VIII Section 12 does 
not grant Mitchell an individual right to strict accountability of 
government monies; instead, the Legislature intended it to protect the 
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public by adopting the proper statutes. Mitchell did not challenge 
whether the SAA fulfills the “strict accountability” requirements of 
Article VIII Section 12, and therefore does not have standing against the 
State.127 
 
2. Mitchell does not have standing with either the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine or the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
 
 The State argues that the Private Attorney General Doctrine does 
not confer standing because it is not a cause of action and does not 
“create a private right of action where none exists.”128 Additionally, the 
State contends that Mitchell does not have standing under the 
Declaratory Judgement Act because it is not a “freestanding source of 
standing” for a plaintiff who does not show an injury or threatened injury 
to himself through the act of a public official.129 The State argues that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is about declaring rights, and Mitchell does 
not have standing because the statutes in question do not confer any 
rights capable of being taken away.130 The State contends that 
“Declaratory claims cannot bootstrap or manufacture standing if no 
individual rights are at issue in the statute that underlies the claims.”131 
Because the SAA does not confer to Mitchell’s rights capable of being 
taken away, their declaratory judgment claims are not judicially 
cognizable.132 
 
3. The Local Government Accounting Act, the Local Government 
Budget Act, and the Debt Management Act do not impose any duties on 
the State. 
 
 The State contends that the Local Government Accounting Act, 
§ 7–6–612(2)(a), applies to the County, as cash reports are made to the 
County’s government body. The State alleges that there is no 
enforcement role for the State or Department in this regard. Additionally, 
the only role the state has in the Local Government Budget Act is that it 
will act as a public repository for local government budgets. There are no 
duties imposed on the State under the Debt Management Act, § 7–7–
2101, which instead concern the county.133 
 
4. Mitchell cannot seek to compel discretionary acts because the 
SAA provides discretionary enforcement powers. 
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 Lastly, the State argues that Mitchell cannot seek a writ of 
mandate to compel the State to enforce the SAA because the SAA does 
not require the Department to withhold financial assistance to local 
governmental entities that do not comply with the law. The Department 
has discretion, under the SAA, to decide whether or not to penalize local 
government entities, and therefore Mitchell cannot seek a writ of 
mandate.134 
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
 This case hinges upon whether Mitchell has a concrete injury to 
constitute standing. If the Court holds that this case is like Helena 
Parents, Columbia Falls, and Grossman, the case could be remanded 
back to the District Court to litigate the other claims. Assuming Glacier 
County mismanaged its funds, the Court will focus on two primary 
questions: whether Mitchell’s claim of a foreseeable injury is enough to 
grant her standing, and whether Mitchell raises the proper claims in order 
to have standing. 
 If the Court follows the precedent set in Helena Parents and 
finds that Mitchell’s foreseeable injury is enough to confer standing, the 
strict standing requirements will be less restrictive for bringing claims 
against government fiscal mismanagement. The standing requirements 
for injury would be interpreted more broadly, as the Court stated in 
Helena Parents. Similar to Helena Parents, there would be standing for 
taxpayers in Glacier County with a foreseeable injury incurred by future 
property tax increases.  This means that Mitchell would have a concrete 
injury by having a threatened injury in the future. On the other hand, if 
the Court decides that a foreseeable injury in the future is not concrete 
enough to confer standing, Glacier County’s analysis that Mitchell’s 
claims are too theoretical may be taken into consideration, requiring that 
taxpayers have to suffer an injury either to their rights or property 
directly before bringing a claim.  
 If the Court follows the precedent established in Grossman and 
holds that Mitchell has standing, then Grossman would allow the Court 
to have more relaxed standards towards taxpayers. Grossman would 
broaden standing to include claims applying to statutory violations. 
Conversely, the Court may hold that Grossman is inapplicable to 
Mitchell’s claims if it finds she did not challenge the constitutional 
validity of the County taxes or argue the constitutionality of the statutes 
in question. 
 As a matter of policy, it appears the Legislative intent of the 
SAA was to ensure that governmental entities are held accountable. § 2–
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7–502(2)(e) in the Montana Code Annotated explicitly states that the 
purpose of the SAA is to “ensure that the stewardship of local 
government entities is conducted in a manner to preserve and protect the 
public trust.”135 If the Court holds that Mitchell has no standing with her 
claims involving the SAA, then the State’s interpretation––that the SAA 
does not give people individual rights to challenge the accountability of 
government and therefore have no standing––gives citizens little 
recourse to hold government officials responsible for their actions. 
 If the Court finds that Mitchell has standing and the case is 
remanded, the District Court will have to decide if Glacier County’s 
audits were in compliance with the SAA. Furthermore, the District court 
would likely have to clarify the SAA regarding issues such as whether it 
is mandatory or discretionary for the Department of Administration to 
enforce certain laws. Additionally, questions about whether the SAA 
grants individual rights to citizens concerning tax issues will need to be 
addressed, as well as the Legislative intent of the SAA regarding how 
much power the SAA has to ensure laws are enforced.  
 Ultimately, the Court will need to decide whether the taxpayers 
have standing to hold government entities accountable for their fiscal 
responsibility to have a balanced budget. The two countervailing factors 
to prudential limitations for standing136 seem to directly apply to this 
case, as potential increased property tax burdens are of great importance 
to the people residing in Glacier County. Additionally, if the Court finds 
that Mitchell and the putative class do not have standing, then the 
statutes in question may be immunized from review. However, if the 
Court decides that Mitchell does not have a concrete injury and has no 
claims that can be remanded to the District Court, then the many 
questions about Glacier County’s budgeting, the State’s role in enforcing 
fiscal mismanagement, and the potential constitutional violation will be 
unanswered.  
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